| 1. | Study on asymmetric information problem and its contermeasure in equipment acquisition
装备采购中的信息不对称问题及其对策研究 |
| 2. | Study on social security in urban areas a game model based on asymmetric information problems
我国低保制度演进的经济学解析一个基于信息不对称的动态博弈模型 |
| 3. | Third , the final part studies how we deal with asymmetric information problems of insurance market in china , comes to a satisfied conclusion
本论文的最后一部分是提出解决问题的对策，该部分是对前两部分论述的融合和总结。 |
| 4. | The subject of the dissertation is asymmetric information problems analysis of insurance market in china . this paper consists of three parts
本论文的选题是中国保险市场的非对称信息问题研究，因此论文的论述是紧紧围绕着这个论题展开的。 |
| 5. | The asymmetric information problems in insurance agents management . sun liming , sun qixiang the government regulation and its innovation in the market economy . lei xiaokang , jia mingde
保险代理人管理中的信息不对称问题一个理论分析框架孙立明孙祁祥 |
| 6. | Second , this paper studies the reasons that the asymmetric information problems of insurance market in china happen are institution and credit
那么中国保险市场产生信息不对称问题的原因是什么呢?文中总结出了主要是保险市场制度不完善的原因和信用的原因。 |
| 7. | The dissertation studies how to solve asymmetric information problems for markets and organizations of china ' s transitional economy by designing optimal transaction rules and how to improve the relevant contracting environments by arranging optimal underlying institutions
本文以中国制度变迁特别是中国公共部门的改革为背景研究市场经济下当委托人与代理人之间存在信息不对称时的最优契约安排及其相应的缔约环境设计问题。 |
| 8. | According to the type of the countermeasure models in information economics , the paper firstly describes and comments on the rothschild - stiglitz screening model applying geometric method of the partial equilibrium . next , the paper constructs the static insurance decision - making models in different moral hazards and a two - stage dynamic model . they together constitute the paper ' s theoretic foundation on the measures and suggestions to solve the asymmetric information problems in our insurance market
根据信息经济学中对各种对策模型的基本分类，本文先运用局部均衡的几何分析方法评述了rothschild - stiglitz信息甄别模型，然后分别构造了不同类型道德风险下的静态保险契约决策模型和二阶段动态博弈模型，它们构成本文针对我国保险市场信息不对称问题提出的各项对策建议的理论基础。 |
| 9. | Basically , the optimal transaction rules or institutions that could be designed or arranged are confined to legally enforceable formal contracts , and never involve those informal contracts , e . g . morality , culture and social customs . however , formal contracts and informal contracts are substitutive and complementary in solving asymmetric information problems
从理论上讲，无论是最优契约的安排还是缔约环境的设计，所规划的只能是那些在法律上具有可执行性的正式合同或正式制度，并不包括以道德、习俗等方式存在的非正式合约，因为非正式合约都是不能为契约设计所左右的外生变量。 |
